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Abstract
We define and study a general framework for approval-based budgeting meth-
ods and compare certain methods within this framework by their axiomatic and
computational properties. Furthermore, we visualize their behavior on certain Eu-
clidean distributions and analyze them experimentally.
1 Introduction
Participatory budgeting [4], initiated by the Brazil workers’ party [27], is gaining in-
creased attention, and is currently applied on many continents, including North Amer-
ica [17] and Europe (e.g., Paris is organizing one of the largest citywide participatory
budgeting processes1). The general premise of participatory budgeting is to let res-
idents of a municipality influence the way by which their common funds are being
distributed, through a deliberative grassroots process. Concretely, residents are partic-
ipating in constructing the municipal budget, by acting as voters and specifying their
preferences over a set of available items; then, an aggregation mechanism (i.e., a bud-
geting method) is applied to decide upon the exact set of items to be funded.
Even though more and more funds are decided through participatory budgets, not
many budgeting methods have been proposed, and no mathematical frameworks to
allow for a systematic comparison between budgeting methods are available, render-
ing their use somewhat ad-hoc. Here we describe such a general framework for the
approval-based setting, in which voters specify subsets of the available items which
they approves of. Corresponding methods within our framework differentiate in two
aspects: (1) The way by which voter satisfaction from a given set of funded items is
defined, modeled through a satisfaction function; and (2) The way these satisfaction
functions are used.
We consider several concrete methods within our framework, including some which
are used in practice and some which generalize known multiwinner voting rules. To
1https://budgetparticipatif.paris.fr/bp
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compare these methods, we (1) consider their computational complexity; (2) define
several axioms, relevant to budgeting methods, and study how well these axioms are
satisfied by the methods at hand; and (3) report on three experiments: In the first two,
we visualize the behavior of these methods on certain Euclidean preferences, by adapt-
ing the methodology of Elkind et al. [7], originally developed for multiwinner voting
rules; in the third experiment we assess how well our budgeting methods deal with
local and global items.
The main contributions of our work are: (1) a general framework of approval-based
budgeting methods and highlight several methods within this framework; (2) several
useful axiomatic properties which are relevant to budgeting methods at large; (3) an
adaptation of the methodology of Elkind et al. [7] to participatory budgeting; and (4)
an evaluation of certain methods within our framework according to their axiomatic,
computational, and visual properties, as well as their ability to deal with local and
global items.
1.1 Related Work
Researchers have considered ordinal-based budgeting methods, in which voters rank
budget items [18, 24]; utility-based budgeting methods, in which voters have numerical
utilities over budget items [15, 3]; and, as we do, approval-based budgeting methods, in
which each voter approves a set of items [18, 19, 3, 2]. Specifically, Goel et al. [18, 19]
study k-Approval, where each voter approves exactly k items, and Knapsack voting,
where each voter approves items while respecting the budget limit. As shown below,
the aggregation method used by Goel et al., in which the winning budget is selected
by greedily considering the items in decreasing number of approvals, fits within our
framework.
Benade et al. [3] consider the implicit utilitarian model [5] and analyze the dis-
tortion achieved by eliciting the preferences of the voters by Knapsack voting and by
Threshold voting (in which voters are asked to approve those items which they eval-
uate above a given threshold); their distortion-based aggregation methods do not fit
within our framework. Aziz et al. [2] generalize multiwinner proportionality axioms to
the setting of participatory budgeting. Their budgeting method, which is a generaliza-
tion of Phragme´n’s sequential method for committee elections, does not fit within our
framework.
As we are interested in axiomatic properties of budgeting methods, we mention the
work of Shapiro and Talmon [24], which considers a generalization of the Condorcet
principle, the paper of Aziz et al. [2], which considers axioms of representation, and
the papers of Fluschnik et al. [15] and Fain et al. [9], which also consider representa-
tion. Our framework of approval-based budgeting methods is a generalization of the
framework studied by Lackner and Skowron [21], which regards approval-based multi-
winner methods. Our framework, as well as theirs, might be seen as the approval-based
variant of the framework of committee scoring rules [8, 11, 10].
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2 Budgeting Methods
2.1 Budgeting Scenarios
We consider the following model of participatory budgeting. A budgeting scenario E
is a tuple E = (A, V, c, `) where A = {a1, . . . , am} is a set of items, c : A → N is
a cost function, so that the cost of item a ∈ A is c(a), V = {v1, . . . , vn} is a set of
voters, where each voter v ∈ V specifies her approval set Av ⊆ A, containing those
items which she approves of, and ` ∈ N is a budget limit.
A budgeting methodR is a function which takes a budgeting scenarioE = (A, V, c, `)
and returns a budget B ⊆ A, such that the total cost of the items of B respects the bud-
get limit; i.e., slightly abusing notation, it must hold that c(B) =
∑
b∈B c(b) ≤ `.
The winning budget (i.e., the set of funded items) for a budgeting scenario E, under
a budgeting method R, is denoted by R(E). With respect to a winning budget B, an
item is budgeted (or funded) if it is contained in B. For simplicity, we ignore issues
related to tie-breaking, which can be dealt with using standard techniques.
2.2 Satisfaction Functions
Budgeting methods in our framework operate by considering the satisfaction of the
voters from possible budgets. To measure the satisfaction of a voter from a possible
winning budget, we use satisfaction functions, defined below.
Definition 1 (Satisfaction function). A satisfaction function f is a function f : 2A ×
2A → N, where A is a set of items. Given a budgeting scenario with a set of items A,
a voter v ∈ V with her approval set Av , and a budget B ⊆ A, the value f(Av, B) is
the satisfaction of v from the budget B.
Example 1. Consider a budgeting scenario with A = {a, b, c}, a voter v with Av =
{a, b}, and a budget B = {b, c}. For a satisfaction function f , the value f(Av, B) =
f({a, b}, {b, c}) is the satisfaction of v from the budget B.
Next we describe a few satisfaction functions. For a budget B and a voter v with
her approval set Av , let Bv := Av ∩B.
1. f(Av, B) = |Bv|: The satisfaction of a voter is the number of budgeted items
she approves of.
2. f(Av, B) =
∑
a∈Bv c(a) = c(Bv): A voter’s satisfaction is the total cost of her
approved items which are budgeted.
3. f(Av, B) = 1|Bv|>0: A voter has satisfaction 0 if none of her approved items is
budgeted, and 1 otherwise (i.e., if at least one of her approved items is budgeted).
2.3 Using Satisfaction Functions
A given satisfaction function can be used in various ways. We consider the following
three approaches.
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Rm|Bv| R
g
|Bv| R
p
|Bv| Rm1|Bv|>0 R
g
1|Bv|>0
Rp
1|Bv|>0
Rmc(Bv) R
g
c(Bv)
Rpc(Bv)
Complexity P P P NP-h P P weak NP-h P P
Budget Mono. X X X X X X X X X
Discount Mono. X X X X X X x x x
Splitting Mono. X X X X X X X x X
Merging Mono. x x x X X x X X X
Limit Mono. x x x x x x x x x
Table 1: Computational and axiomatic properties of certain approval-based budgeting
methods.
1. Max rules: For a satisfaction function f , the rule Rmf selects, as a winning
budget, a budget which maximizes the sum of voters’ satisfaction, according to
f . Formally,Rmf selects argmaxB⊆A
∑
v∈V f(Av, B).
2. Greedy rules: For a satisfaction function f , the rule Rgf proceeds in iterations,
maintaining a partial budget B, where in each iteration it adds an item a to B
which maximizes the value
∑
v∈V f(Av, B ∪ {a}).
3. Proportional greedy rules: The rule Rpf is similar to Rgf , except that in each
iteration it adds an item a to B which maximizes:(∑
v∈V f(Av, B ∪ {a})−
∑
v∈V f(Av, B)
)
/ c(a).
Remark 1. The above examples of satisfaction functions and approaches result in 9
budgeting methods which we discuss throughout the paper. Indeed, studying other
functions and approaches is an immediate future work direction. We chose those func-
tions and approaches as they are natural, generalize known multiwinner voting rules,
and include some known budgeting methods: Rm
1|Bv|>0
generalizes approval-based
Chamberlin–Courant [6] and Rg
1|Bv|>0
generalizes the greedy approximation of this
rule [22]. Furthermore, Rg|Bv| is similar to the popular k-Approval and Knapsack vot-
ing [18] (the aggregation method is the same, albeit k-Approval and Knapsack restrict
the voter approval sets; we do not consider such restrictions in our framework, as we
are interested in the aggregation).
Below, we study the computational and axiomatic properties of these nine budget-
ing methods, and report on simulations.
3 Budgeting Algorithms
We consider the computational complexity of identifying winning budgets. First, it
follows from the definitions of the Greedy rules and the Proportional greedy rules that
computing their winners, given that the functions used can be computed efficiently,
can be done in polynomial time; this holds as these rules are defined through efficient
iterative processes. This is not the case for Max rules, which in general are NP-hard.
(To be concrete, next we consider a specific Max rule; to be formally correct, we show
NP-hardness for deciding whether a budget with at least a given total satisfaction, i.e.,
sum of satisfaction values, exists.)
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Observation 1. Given a budgeting scenario and a bound s, deciding whether a feasible
budget B for which
∑
v∈V 1|Bv|>0 ≥ s exists is NP-hard.
Proof. Notice thatRm
1|Bv|>0
generalizes the CC rule [6], which is NP-hard [23]. Also,
when all items are of unit cost, the problem is equivalent to Max Cover [16, 25].
Next we consider other Max rules.
Proposition 1. Identifying a winning budget under Rm|Bv| can be done in polynomial
time.
Proof. An efficient algorithm can be realized by noticing the similarity to the KNAP-
SACK problem [16] and recalling that KNAPSACK is solvable in polynomial-time when-
ever one of the dimensions is given in unary. Specifically, the relevant information for
an item a is its number of approvals S(a) and its cost2 c(a); and, while the cost c(a)
of any item a is given in binary, and thus can be superpolynomial in the input size, the
number S(a) of approvals of a can be at most |V |, and thus polynomial in the input
size. Thus a dynamic program, that computes the values of T (i, z), i ∈ [m], z ∈ [n·m],
which stand for the cost of the cheapest budget with total satisfaction of at least z from
the first i items, runs in polynomial time. To be more concrete, it is useful to view the
input election as a binary matrix with n rows and m columns, such that the (i, j)th cell
is 1 if the ith voter approves the jth item and 0 otherwise. Let S be the number of ones
in this representation of the input election as a binary matrix. Then, we will populate a
table T with m rows and Z columns, such that the (i, z)th cell would hold the cost of
the cheapest budget which achieves a total satisfaction of exactly z while considering
only the first i items, or 0 if it is not possible, where by “not possible” we mean either
that there is no subset of items which would give this exact total satisfaction or that we
could not afford any such subset, due to the budget limit.
To populate the first row, T (1, z), for each z ∈ Z we set T (1, z) to c(a1) if the
total satisfaction of a1 is z, and 0 otherwise. To populate the ith row, T (i, z), for each
z ∈ Z we first compute the total satisfaction S(j) of aj ; then, we go over the cells
T (j, z − S(j)), j ∈ [i − 1] and locate the cell with the minimum value v; if all these
cells are 0 then we set T (i, z) to 0 as well, while if not then we set T (i, z) to v+ c(aj);
now, we go over the cells T (j, z), j ∈ [i−1], and if there is a cell whose value is strictly
positive but strictly less than v+c(aj) then we set T (i, z) to this value (this corresponds
to not funding the item aj). After populating the table we go over the columns, starting
from Z towards 1 and locate the first column which is not completely filled with zeros;
then, we take the cell with the minimum value from this column which is not zero as
the cost of the winning budget (the budget itself can be computed by usual techniques
of dynamic programming).
Proposition 2. Identifying winning budgets underRmc(Bv) can be done in pseudopoly-
nomial time. Further, given a budgeting scenario and a bound s, deciding whether
there is a feasible budget B with
∑
v∈V f(Av, B) ≥ s, for f(Av, B) =
∑
a∈Bv c(a),
is weakly NP-hard.
2In the Knapsack literature, these are usually referred to as the value and the weight of the item; we use
the jargon of budgeting scenarios and not the Knapsack jargon.
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Proof. Weak NP-hardness follows by a straightforward reduction from the SUBSET
SUM problem [16]: Given a Subset Sum instance with integers X = {x1, . . . , xn},
where the existence of a subset X ′ ⊆ X with ∑x∈X′ x = Z is to be decided, we
construct the following budgeting scenario: For each integer xi, we create a voter
vi approving an item ai of cost c(ai) = xi, and set the limit to be ` = Z. For a
yes-instance of Subset Sum, a winning budget shall be of total cost Z, thus weak NP-
hardness follows.
The reduction above also hints on the pseudopolynomial-time algorithm forRmc(Bv):
Apply dynamic programming similar to that for Subset Sum, by iterating over the items
and remembering the maximum total satisfaction that can be achieved for each amount
of money.
3.1 Coping with Intractability
We describe a simple Integer Linear Program (ILP) for Max rules over satisfaction
functions which can be defined using ILPs; note that all satisfaction functions consid-
ered here (i.e., |Bv|, 1|Bv|>0, and c(Bv)) can be defined using ILPs. This is useful due
to the availability of efficient ILP solvers. Indeed, the simulations reported below were
performed using the Gurobi ILP solver [20] on such ILP formulations.
Observation 2. Let f be a satisfaction function which can be formulated as an ILP.
Then, identifying a winning budget underRmf can be done using an ILP.
Proof. Introduce a binary variable xa for each a ∈ A, which is 1 if and only if the item
a is to be budgeted. Add a budget constraint
∑
a∈A c(a) · xa ≤ ` and set the objective
to be max
∑
v∈V f(Av, B).
Next is a general, parameterized complexity result.
Observation 3. For all Max rules, the problem of deciding whether a winning budget
of total cost at least a given value is fixed-parameter tractable for the number m of
items, but there are some Max rules for which this problem is hard even when n = 1,
where n is the number of voters.
Proof. Fixed-parameter tractability with respect to the number m of items follows by
considering all feasible budgets. Para-NP-hardness with respect to the number n of
voters holds, e.g., for the rule Rmc(Bv), by observing that it can encode instances of
Subset Sum [16] even with just one voter: Create one voter which approves all the
items, where each item has cost equal to a number from the Subset Sum instance. Then,
to decide whether there is a winning budget of total satisfaction at least the value asked
for in the Subset Sum instance corresponds to deciding the Subset Sum instance.
For Rmc(Bv), which is weakly NP-hard (see Proposition 2) even when there is only
one voter (see the proof of Observation 3), we have a pseudopolynomial time algorithm
(see the proof of Proposition 2) and an FPTAS, as we show next.
Observation 4. There is an FPTAS forRmc(Bv).
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Proof. Notice that given an instance of Rmc(Bv), one can reduce it to an instance of
Knapsack: For each item, create a Knapsack element of weight equal to the cost of the
item and of value equal to the cost of the item times the number of voters approving this
item. Then, the result follows from the existence of an FPTAS for Knapsack [26].
As for Rm
1|Bv|>0
, which is NP-hard (see Observation 1), and for which there is no
approximation algorithm with better than 1−1/e approximation ratio (as it generalizes
the multiwinner voting rule CC for approval elections, which itself is equivalent to the
Max Cover problem [14, 25]), next we show that it is fixed-parameter tractable for the
number n of the voters.
Proposition 3. Rm
1|Bv|>0
is fixed-parameter tractable for n.
Proof. Guess the partition of the voters with the intended meaning that each group of
voters in the partition is represented by the same item. For each such group, guess
the number of voters which would be satisfied. Then, go over all items and pick as
representative the cheapest item that makes exactly this number of voters in this group
satisfied.
4 Budgeting Axioms
In this section we suggest several axiomatic properties which are relevant to budgeting
methods. In particular, we focus on axioms which relate to the costs of the items. For
each axiom, after providing the definition we check which of the rules in our framework
satisfy it.
Our first axiom models the very natural expectation that if within a budgeting sce-
nario we can afford to budget more items, then we should. Formally, we express it as
follows.
Definition 2 (Budget Monotonicity). A budgeting method R satisfies Budget Mono-
tonicity if for each budgeting scenario E = (A, V, c, `) and each pair of feasible bud-
gets B and B′ such that B ⊂ B′ it holds that if B is winning then also B′ is winning.
Perhaps surprisingly, the next example, admittedly somewhat artificial, demon-
strates that not all rules in our framework satisfy Budget Monotonicity.
Example 2. Let f(Av, B) = min({c(a) : a ∈ Bv}); that is, the satisfaction of a voter
equals the cost of her cheapest approved item which is budgeted. Then, Rmf does not
satisfy Budget monotonicity (to see it, consider two items a, b of cost 1, 2 respectively,
one voter approving both a and b, and a pair of budgets B = {a} and B′ = {a, b}).
Nevertheless, notice that all three satisfaction functions we consider here (namely
f = |Bv|, f = 1|Bv|>0, and f = c(Bv)) are super-set monotone; that is, for each
of them, we have that f(B′) ≥ f(B) for each B ⊂ B′. Thus, since one can verify
that Max rules are Budget Monotone for super-set monotone satisfaction functions, we
have the following.
Corollary 1. Rm|Bv|,Rmc(Bv), andRm1|Bv|>0 , satisfy Budget Monotonicity.
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For Greedy rules and Proportional greedy rules, it is never the case that two feasible
budgets B, B′ with B ⊂ B′ are both winning, so we have the following.
Corollary 2. Rg|Bv|, R
g
c(Bv)
, Rg
1|Bv|>0
, Rp|Bv|, R
p
c(Bv)
, and Rp
1|Bv|>0
, satisfy Budget
Monotonicity.
In the next axiom we consider the response of our rules to increasing the available
limit. Specifically, we require that if we increase the limit, then all budgeted items
remain budgeted, provided that no new item becomes affordable (this last condidtion is
quite natural; if there is an item that all the voters approve, which is above the budget
limit before its extension but is within the limit after the extension, then it is quite
natural that this item might be budgeted and might remove many previously budgeted
ones). This axiom is analogous to the committee monotonicity axiom from the world
of multiwinner elections [8].
Definition 3 (Limit Monotonicity). We say that a budgeting method R satisfies Limit
Monotonicity if for each pair of budgeting scenariosE = (A, V, c, `),E′ = (A, V, c, `+
1) with no item which costs exactly `+1, for each a ∈ A, it holds that a ∈ R(E) =⇒
a ∈ R(E′).
Proposition 4. Neither ofRm|Bv|,Rmc(Bv), andRm1|Bv|>0 satisfies Limit Monotonicity.
Proof. Below we consider each of the three rules separately.
Rm
1|Bv|>0
: Consider a budgeting scenario E with items a, b, and c, all of unit cost,
and four voters: v1 : {a}; v2 : {a, b}; v3 : {b, c}; v4 : {c}. Then, with budget limit 1
a winning budget might be {b}, while with budget limit 2 the only winning budget is
{a, c}.
Rmc(Bv): Consider a budgeting scenario E with items a, b, c, and d, with costs 2, 3, 3,
and 5, respectively, and one voter: v1 : {a, b, c, d}. Then, with budget limit 6 the only
winning budget is {b, c}, while with budget limit 7 the only winning budget is {a, d}.
Rm|Bv|: Consider a budgeting scenario E with the same items as above and five voters:
v1 : {a, b, c, d}; v2 : {a, b, c, d}; v3 : {b, c, d}; v4 : {d}; v5 : {d}. Then, with budget
limit 6 the only winning budget is {b, c}, while with budget limit 7 the only winning
budget is {a, d}.
Greedy and Proportional greedy rules also fail Limit Monotonicity. Consider a
budgeting scenario with items a, b, and c, where a has the largest value according to
the relevant satisfaction function; thus, a is selected in the first iteration. Set the cost
of a so that, after selecting it, the remaining budget limit is such that, for the original
budget limit `, only b can be selected, while for the budget limit ` + 1, also c can be
selected. Set the value of c to be higher than that of b. Thus, b is selected in the first
case and c in the second case.
Corollary 3. Rg|Bv|, R
g
c(Bv)
, Rg
1|Bv|>0
, Rp|Bv|, R
p
c(Bv)
, and Rp
1|Bv|>0
, do not satisfy
Limit Monotonicity.
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A budgeting method R satisfies Discount Monotonicity if any budgeted item re-
mains budgeted when its price decreases. This is a very desirable property as failing
it means that people proposing new items for the participatory budget have to think
strategically about the item’s price, instead of trying to minimize it.
Definition 4 (Discount Monotonicity). A budgeting methodR satisfies Discount Mono-
tonicity if for each budgeting scenario E = (A, V, c, `) and for each b ∈ R(E), it
holds that b ∈ R(E′) for E′ = (A, V, c′, `), where for each item a ∈ A, we have that
c′(a) = c(a) whenever a 6= b, and c′(b) = c(b)− 1.
Proposition 5. Rm|Bv|, Rm1|Bv|>0 , R
g
|Bv|, R
g
1|Bv|>0
, Rp|Bv|, and R
p
1|Bv|>0
, satisfy Dis-
count Monotonicity, whileRmc(Bv),R
g
c(Bv)
, andRpc(Bv) fail it.
Proof. Intuitively, for f = |Bv| and f = 1|Bv|>0, decreasing the cost only increases
the attractiveness of the item, while for f = c(Bv), decreasing the cost makes the item
less attractive.
More formally, letE be the original election andE′ be the modified election, where
in E′ the cost of item b decreases. Then, for Rm
1|Bv|>0
and for Rm|Bv|, assume, coun-
terpositively, that there is some B′ which wins in E′ and b /∈ B′, but there is some B
which wins in E and b ∈ B. Consider the total satisfaction TS(B) which B achieves
and the total satisfaction TS(B′) which B′ achieves; notice first that the total satisfac-
tion does not depend on the election (that is, the total satisfaction of some set of items
achieves for E is the same as it achieves for E′). Notice further that B′ is feasible for
E and that, in E′, the total satisfaction of B′ is the maximum that can be achieved, thus
we have that TS(B) ≥ TS(B′). Now, since B is feasible also in E′, we conclude that
B shall be winning in E′.
For Rg
1|Bv|>0
, Rg|Bv|, R
p
1|Bv|>0
, and for Rp|Bv|, consider the iteration in which b is
selected for the budgeting scenario E, and observe that it would be selected also for
the budgeting scenario E′, as its relative value does not decrease. ForRmc(Bv),R
g
c(Bv)
,
and for Rpc(Bv), consider a budgeting scenario with two items a, b, with c(a) = 2 and
c(b) = 2, and one voter: v1 : {a, b}. Let the budget limit be 2. Then, in this original
budgeting scenario, the budget {b} is winning, while if the cost of b decreases by one,
then the only winning budget is {a}.
The next two axioms regard the situation of a person proposing a new item, pro-
vided that this new item has some internal structure and can be presented either as
a single one or as several items (e.g., renovation of a school can either be a single
project, or several ones, including painting the interior, painting the exterior, buying
new furniture etc.). We consider splitting and merging items.
Definition 5 (Splitting Monotonicity). A budgeting methodR satisfies Splitting Mono-
tonicity if for each budgeting scenario E = (A, V, c, `), for each a ∈ R(E), and for
each budgeting scenario E′ which is formed by splitting a into a set of items A′ with
c(a) = c(A′), and such that the voters which approve a in E approve all items of A′ in
E′ and no other voters approve items of A′, it holds thatR(E′) ∩A′ 6= ∅. Similarly, a
budgeting methodR satisfies Strong Splitting Monotonicity if it holds that A′ ⊆ RE′ .
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Proposition 6. Rm|Bv|, Rm1|Bv|>0 , R
g
|Bv|, R
g
1|Bv|>0
, Rp|Bv|, R
p
1|Bv|>0
, Rmc(Bv), and
Rpc(Bv), satisfy Splitting Monotonicity, while R
g
c(Bv)
does not satisfy Splitting Mono-
tonicity.
Proof. Intuitively, Rgc(Bv) does not satisfy Splitting Monotonicity as the new items’
value is less than the original item’s value. For other rules, the new items’ value is at
least as the original item’s value, thus at least one is selected. More formally, let us
denote the original item which is being splitted by a, and the new items which a is
splitted into as A = {a1, . . .}; we refer to a is the original item, and to items ai as the
new items.
For Rm
1|Bv|>0
, Rg
1|Bv|>0
, and for Rp
1|Bv|>0
, observe that each of the new items
covers the same number of voters as the original item. Thus, if the original item made
it to the budget, so will at least one of the new items, and so Splitting Monotonicity
follows. Strong Splitting Monotonicity does not hold forRm
1|Bv|>0
, e.g., by considering
a budgeting scenario with item a and b, with a approved by some voters while b is
approved by other voters: While a might be budgeted even if it takes the whole budget
limit, after the splitting only one of the new items shall be budgeted, allowing more
funds to be spent on b.
For Rm|Bv|, R
g
|Bv|, and for R
p
|Bv|, observe that the value of each new item is the
same as the value of the original item. Thus, all of the new items will be budgeted,
rendering these rules as Strong Splitting Monotone.
To see why the budgeting method Rmc(Bv) satisfies Strong Splitting Monotonicity,
notice that the total satisfaction of budgeting the new items together is the same as
budgeting the original item. To see why the budgeting methodRpc(Bv) satisfies Splitting
Monotonicity, consider the iteration in which the original item is selected, and observe
that any of the new items has the same value. To see why the budgeting methodRgc(Bv)
does not satisfy Splitting Monotonicity, consider, e.g., a budgeting scenario with items
a, b, with c(a) = 3, c(b) = 3. Then, split b into b1, b2, b3, each of cost 1, consider one
voter: v1 : {a, b}, and budget limit 3. Since the value of a is 3, it would get selected in
the splitted election, while in the original election b might be selected.
Definition 6 (Merging Monotonicity). A budgeting methodR satisfies Merging Mono-
tonicity if for each budgeting scenario E = (V,A, c, `), and for each A′ ⊆ R(E) such
that for each v ∈ V we either have v ∩ A′ = ∅ or A′ ⊆ v, it holds that a ∈ R(E′) for
E′ = (A \ A′ ∪ {a}, V ′, c′, `), c′(a) = ∑a∈A′ c(a), and each voter v ∈ V for which
A′ ⊆ v in E, approves a in E′, and no other voter approves a.
Proposition 7. Rm
1|Bv|>0
, Rmc(Bv), R
g
1|Bv|>0
, Rgc(Bv), and R
p
c(Bv)
, satisfy Merging
Monotonicity, whileRp
1|Bv|>0
,Rm|Bv|,R
g
|Bv|, andR
p
|Bv| fail it.
Proof. Intuitively, for the satisfaction function f(Av, B) = |Bv|, the value of the orig-
inal items decreases but the merged item is as expensive. For f(Av, B) = c(Bv), the
value of the merged item equals the total value of the merged items. For f(Av, B) =
1|Bv|>0 the fact that all the original items were budgeted means that the merged item
still satisfies the same voters.
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x Rm|Bv| R
g
|Bv| R
p
|Bv| Rm1|Bv|>0 R
g
1|Bv|>0
Rp
1|Bv|>0
Rmc(Bv) R
g
c(Bv)
Rpc(Bv)
10
30
90
190
Table 2: Results of Experiment 1.
More formally, we refer to the items of A′ in the original budgeting scenario E as
the original items, and to the new item a in the modified budgeting scenario E′ as the
merged item.
To see why Rm
1|Bv|>0
and Rmc(Bv) satisfy Merging Monotonicity, assume, counter-
positively, that B is a winning budget of E with A′ ⊆ B, but that no winning budget
of E′ contains a; so there is some B′ which is winning in E′ but a /∈ B′. But then, B′
would achieve a strictly higher total satisfaction in E′, which is equal to its total satis-
faction in E, and so B′ would be winning in E as well, contradicting the assumption.
To see why Rg
1|Bv|>0
and Rpc(Bv) satisfy Merging Monotonicity, consider the iter-
ation in which one of the items of A′ is selected, and observe that, in this iteration, a
would be selected, as it gets the same increase of the total satisfaction.
To see why Rgc(Bv) satisfies Merging Monotonicity, consider again the iteration in
which one of the items of A′ is selected, and observe that a would get even higher
increase of the total satisfaction, thus will be selected in this iteration as well. To see
whyRp
1|Bv|>0
do not satisfy Merging Monotonicity, observe that the proportional value
increase of the merged item is smaller then that of the original items.
To see why Rm|Bv|, R
g
|Bv|, and R
p
|Bv|, do not satisfy Merging Monotonicity, con-
sider a budgeting scenario with items a, b, c, d, and e, with c(a) = c(b) = c(c) = 1
and c(d) = c(e) = 2. Let the budget limit be 4 and let there be three voters:
v1 : {a, b, c, d, e}; v2 : {a, b, c, d, e}; v3 : {a, b, c}. Then, the winning budget is
{a, b, c}, while if we merge a, b, and c, into one item, then {d, e} would be the winning
budget.
5 Experiments on Budgeting Methods
In this section we report on three experiments: Two experiments generalize the tech-
nique of Elkind et al. [7], used quite extensively for multiwinner elections [12, 1, 13],
to the setting of approval-based budgeting scenarios. One experiment focuses on the
issue of global and local items.
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x Rm|Bv| R
g
|Bv| R
p
|Bv| Rm1|Bv|>0 R
g
1|Bv|>0
Rp
1|Bv|>0
Rmc(Bv) R
g
c(Bv)
Rpc(Bv)
0
10
50
70
100
Table 3: Results of Experiment 2.
In each experiment we consider the 2-dimensional Euclidean domain, where both
voters and items correspond to ideal points on a 2-dimensional plane; for clarity, we set
this 2-dimensional plane to be of width 1 and height 1, where (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), and
(1, 1), denote, respectively, the left-bottom point, the left-top point, the right-bottom
point, and the right-top point. Concretely, each particular simulation setting consists
of: (1) a distribution of the ideal points of the voters; (2) a distribution of the ideal
points of the items; (3) a distribution of the item costs; (4) a budget limit; and (5) a
threshold function which, based on the positions and costs, creates approval sets for
the voters.
For the first two experiments, for each particular simulation setting we generate
several corresponding budgeting scenarios by sampling from these distributions, com-
pute the winning budget in each of them, and aggregate the results into a 2-dimensional
histogram. These histograms are formed by first partitioning the square from (0, 0) to
(1, 1) into bins (we use 50 × 50 bins). Then, we draw a pixel in each of these bins,
where the more funds spent on this bin, the brighter the pixel is drawn. Specifically, de-
noting the total funds used by y and the funds used in a certain bin by x, we normalize
these values using the formula arctan(
x/0.0005∗y)
pi/2 .
Experiment 1 and 2 (depicted in Table 2 and 3, resp.). We describe Experiment 1
and 2 together, as they share a lot in common. We have:
1. voters, positioned uniformly on a disc of radius 0.3, centered at position (0.5, 0.5);
we have 50 such voters for Experiment 1 and 100 for Experiment 2;
2. 50 cheap items, positioned uniformly on a disc of radius 0.2, centered at (0.3, 0.5),
and 50 expensive items, positioned uniformly on a disc of radius 0.2, centered at
(0.7, 0.5);
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Table 4: Results of Experiment 3. The top, middle, and bottom figure are for ` = 20,
30, and 50, respectively.
3. the cheap items cost 10 each, while the expensive items cost 100 each for Exper-
iment 2, and for Experiment 1, we use a parameter x for the cost of the expensive
items (so Table 2 shows histograms for various values of x);
4. the budget limit is 1000 for Experiment 1 and 200 for Experiment 2;
5. for Experiment 1: Each voter approves the 10 items which are the closest to her;
for Experiment 2: The approval sets of the voters are generated with respect to
a parameter x, as follows: for each cheap item, we identify the 5 voters which
are the closest to it, and add the item to their approval sets; for each expensive
item, we identify the x voters which are the closest to it, and add the item to their
approval sets.
Each histogram is an aggregation of 100 single elections.
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Informally speaking, the approval sets in Experiment 1 are generated “from the
point-of-view of the voters”, while in Experiment 2 they are generated “from the point-
of-view of the items”.
Experiment 3 focuses on the issue of global and local items: Consider, e.g., a bud-
geting scenario with some city-level projects and some neighborhood-level projects.
Ideally, we would want some mix of city-level projects and neighborhood-level projects
to be budgeted. While it is possible to achieve some mix artificially (e.g., requiring
voters to select both city-level projects and neighborhood-level projects), here we are
interested in finding out the natural such mix that rules in our framework achieve.
Experiment 3 (depicted in Table 4). We have: (1) 20 voters, positioned uniformly
on the whole 1× 1 square; (2) 5 items, termed global items, which are also positioned
uniformly on the square; and another 30 items, termed local items, also positioned
uniformly on the square; (3) each global item and each local item costs 5; (4) we vary
the budget limit between 20 and 50; (5) the approval sets of the voters are populated
with respect to a parameter p, as follows: For each pair of a voter and a global item, we
let the voter approve the global item with some probability p. For each pair of a voter
and a local item, we let the voter approve the local item if and only if their Euclidean
distance is at most 0.2. In Table 4 each datapoint is averaged over 100 repetitions and
we consider the average funds spent on local items as a function of the probability p of
approving a global item.
5.1 Experimental Results
Next we discuss the results of our experiments, depicted in Tables 2, 3, and 4.
In Table 2, and focusing on the Max rules, it is visible thatRmc(Bv) prefers expensive
items the most,Rm|Bv| prefers expensive items the least, whileRm1|Bv|>0 is somehow in
between. This can be seen specifically by noticing thatRm|Bv| ceases to select expensive
items as soon as x = 30, Rm
1|Bv|>0
ceases to select expensive items only when x =
190, while Rmc(Bv) keeps on selecting expensive items even when x = 190. This
is intuitively appealing, as expensive items are useful for Rmc(Bv) and not useful forRm|Bv|; for Rm1|Bv|>0 , while the costs of the items are not useful, their positions are, as
the rule’s goal is to as many voters as possible. The greedy rules are also somehow in
between the extremes, while, as expected, the proportional greedy rules prefer cheaper
items.
This general behavior is consistent with Experiment 2, as can be seen in Table 3.
Specifically, observe that Rmc(Bv) switches to budgeting only expensive items as soon
as x = 10, whileRm|Bv| switches to budgeting only expensive items only when x = 70;
due to the positions of the expensive items, and due to the fact that they cover different
sets of voters, Rm
1|Bv|>0
interleave cheap items with expensive items (except for the
corner cases of x = 0 and x = 100).
As for locality issues, the result depicted in Table 4 for ` = 20 demonstrate that
Rmc(Bv) starts to consider global items first, withRm|Bv| after it, andRm1|Bv|>0 being the
last to consider global items. As ` increases,Rmc(Bv) andRm|Bv| select more local items
whileRm
1|Bv|>0
is not affected.
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One particularly interesting observation from our experiments is that the greedy
rule used by Goel [18],Rg|Bv| in our language, behaves substantially differently from its
Max variant,Rm|Bv|. This is quite visible in the first two columns of Tables 2 and 3. The
Max variant gives much more attention to the cheap items than the greedy one. Thus
the choice between these two rules—already made by many users of Goel’s work—
may have nonnegligible consequences.
6 Outlook
We have defined a framework for approval-based budgeting methods and studied nine
rules within it, considered their computational and axiomatic properties, and reported
on simulations to evaluate them experimentally. Our framework, and the axiomatic
properties we consider, can be used to better evaluate known budgeting methods, as
well as propose new budgeting methods, which might prove to have better theoretical
guarantees and better practical behavior. E.g., our results show that, while Rg|Bv| is
used extensively in practice (see, e.g., [18]), it produces significantly different results
than the rule which it approximates, namelyRm|Bv|.
An immediate future research direction would be to study more satisfaction func-
tions and ways of using them, which would correspond to more rules within our frame-
work. Furthermore, defining and studying more axiomatic properties which are rele-
vant to budgeting methods, as well as performing more extensive experimental analysis
on various budgeting methods would help in better understanding these rules.
Another avenue for future research is to seek general results for rules in the frame-
work, such as identifying classes of rules within the framework which satisfy certain
axiomatic properties, and better understanding which budgeting methods reside within
the framework and which do not.
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